In this paper we examine an alternative policy scenario, where governments allow polluting …rms to trade permits in a strategic environmental policy model. We demonstrate, among other things, that with no market power in the permits market, governments of the exporting …rms do not have an incentive to under-regulate pollution in order to become more competitive. This strategic e¤ect is reversed and leads to a welfare level closer to the cooperative one and strictly higher to that when permits are non-tradable. Allowing for market power in the permits market, the incentive to under-regulate pollution re-appears regardless of whether permits are tradable or not. With tradable permits, however, the incentive to under-regulate pollution is comparatively weaker relative to the case of non-tradable permits. This entails potential bene…ts for the exporting …rms and countries since the prisoners'dilemma is moderated.
Introduction
Recent negotiations among the major polluting countries concerning the restrictions of greenhouse gas emissions, like CO2, surfaced the di¢ culty of …nding common cooperative policies. 1 This di¢ culty brought into light old concerns on the strategic use of environmental policies, aiming towards enhancing the international competitiveness of the exporting industries. Today it is common understanding that some developing countries, such as China and India, favor increased production at the cost of environmental degradation consistently. However, this attitude is not a 'privilege'of developing countries only. For many decades the US and many western European countries, took advantage of the lack of environmental regulation and developed cost-minimizing and productionmaximizing technologies without consideration of their environmental consequences (see footnote 1).
The 'Strategic Environmental Policy'or 'Ecological Dumping'literature, mainly established by Barrett (1994) , Kennedy (1993) , Conrad (1993) , Rauscher (1994) and Ulph (1996) , has provided interesting theoretical research on this issue. 2 A common suggestion in this literature is that governments engaging in international competition have a unilateral incentive to set the environmental regulation below the …rst best level when their representative …rms compete a-là Cournot in world commodity markets. The rationale is that laxer environmental regulation provides a credible commitment device to the exporting …rms, which leads them to increase their outputs and gain market shares from their rivals. 3 Turning to a di¤erent strand of the literature, Montgomery (1972) in his seminal work 1 A recent example are the annual negotiations that took place in Bali in December 2007. Delegates from 189 di¤erent countries negotiated a new pact to succeed the Kyoto protocol. However, the US and Australia refused to sign the pact claiming that the rati…cation of the Kyoto protocol would unfairly damage their energy-export based economies and cost jobs.
2 Recent contributions to this literature e.g., Neary (2006) , Simpson and Bradford (1996) , Bayindir-Upmann (2003) , Greaker (2003) and Straume (2006) develop extensions and point out earlier limitations.
3 Recent empirical …ndings by Levinson and Taylor (2008) , Woods (2006) , Ederington et al. (2005) , Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) and Ederington and Minier (2003) argue that indeed there is strategic interaction in an environmental policy setting and that environmental policy can be used as a secondary trade barrier.
argued that under perfect competition in product and permits markets, the use of tradable permits can lead to the cost minimizing solution and thus to greater welfare. Based on this result, during the last two decades regulators have extended the use of tradable permits. For instance, at the …rm level the European Union implemented a wide carbon trading scheme since 2005 (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007) , while in the US greenhouse gas emissions have been regulated locally through regional carbon dioxide trading schemes since 2001 (Rose et al., 2006) . Both studies converge to the conclusion that overall e¢ ciency of the system has improved after the introduction of tradable permits.
However, the policy implications of the use of tradable permits become less clear when product or permit markets are not perfectly competitive. For example, the main polluters seem to be the large chemical industries, characterized by large scale economies. Sartzetakis (1997 , 2004 ), von der Fehr (1993 and Ehrhart et al. (2008) , among others, provide examples where the existence of imperfect competition in the products markets, result in lower welfare levels. This result is exacerbated when a single …rm can exert market power in the permits market, e.g., Hahn (1984) , or more signi…cantly when market power is determined endogenously and multilaterally, e.g., Malueg and Yates (2009) and Lange (2008) .
To the best of our knowledge, there is no attempt in the literature, to incorporate tradable permits in a model of strategic environmental policy. That is because eco-dumping models imply that the governments decide unilaterally about the level of pollution allowed. Therefore, questions such as the following, arise; why one country accepts pollution from a rival one? Wouldn't this create an incentive to issue a large number of permits in each country leading to environmental degradation? If countries were to accept each other's allowances, what would restrict them from achieving a fully cooperative outcome such that welfare is maximized? In this paper we address these questions and we support the necessity and the potential bene…ts that may arise from the adoption of such a system. We develop a model of an international symmetric duopoly where each government decides unilaterally the level of regulation but the …rms are allowed to trade permits in a competitive permits market. Our main result suggests that if both countries allow trading of emission permits at the …rm level, the unilateral incentive of the governments to set environmental policy insu¢ ciently lax is reversed. This result holds irrespective of whether the model is symmetric or not and of the number of participants in the game.
The policy implication of this outcome is that, when governments bargain for setting emissions caps, they are involved in a race to the top. This race to the top leads to higher welfare in the exporting countries compared to the case of non-tradable permits, and approaches the welfare of a cooperative solution game. The bene…t of such a system versus a cooperative solution is that the governments do not have an incentive to deviate unilaterally from such a strategy. Thus, based on this result we conclude that countries with similar characteristics that allow cross boundary trading of pollution permits, should not worry about the welfare consequences of competition in environmental standards with the rival countries. The welfare implications remain una¤ected when the …rms exercise market power in the permits market.
The model
We consider a symmetric two country, home and foreign, two stage game. Each country is represented by an exporting …rm. In stage 1 the rival governments select the environmental regulation level simultaneously so as to maximize welfare. Then in stage 2 the …rms compete a-là Cournot in a world commodity market. 4 In order to focus on strategic trade issues we further assume that consumption of the goods in the two countries is zero, thus total production by the two …rms is exported to the rest of the world (ROW).
Production for the domestic …rm is denoted by x, and the production cost is denoted by c(x), where c x 0 and c xx 0 determine the marginal cost of production and the convexity of the cost function, respectively. Total revenues are r(x; X), and we assume that the two outputs are substitutes, r X (x; X) < 0.
We assume that production is associated with a pollutant which a¤ects the citizens in both the exporting countries. Let denote e as the amount of pollution that the domestic …rm is allowed to emit, or equivalently the number of issued permits. The damage caused from pollution in the domestic country is
and 2 (0; 1]. When = 1 the pollutant is perfectly transboundary and thus emissions in the rival country a¤ect equally the citizens in the home country, while in any other case is partially transboundary. 5 We further assume that each …rm has a private abatement technology available, a, which allows adherence to the binding amount of permits issued by the governments. At the same time the governments allow the …rms to trade permits. Each …rm can increase (reduce) production above (below) e, if it buys (sells) pollution permits from the rival one at a given price P " de…ned by the governments. This ensures that the …rms are price takers in the permits market, in other words the permits market is competitive. 6 This is a simplifying assumption, yet at this point we aim to exploit the maximum of the possible bene…ts arising from the use of permits and thus we use this as an extreme or a reference scenario. Later on in the analysis, we relax this assumption and we examine how market power in the permits market weakens our results. If P " is su¢ ciently high (low) it may be convenient for the …rm to sell (buy) an amount e > 0 (< 0) of its initially allocated permits e which drives the …rm to reduce (increase) emissions by e,
where e e. 7 Given the possibility of trading permits, abatement is assumed to be 5 Cross-border pollution is modeled here as in Kennedy (1994) . However, it can be modeled in various ways di¤erent from e + E. An alternative way used in the relevant literature would be (1 )e + E or more generally 1 e + 2 E. In such a case the results are not modi…ed qualitatively.
6 This implies that the permits price is exogenous for the …rms. This could be the case if the governments set the price at the world price level obtained from a global market of permits or any other price.
The assumption that the permits market may be competitive while the output market not it is common in the relevant literature, e.g., Sartzetakis (1997 Sartzetakis ( , 2004 .
7 Note that e is multiplied by because one unit of pollution in the home country implies units of pollution in the foreign country. A permit allowing one unit of pollution at home should allow extra units to the foreign …rm when it is sold to the foreign …rm. In order to keep the sum of pollution in the two countries constant after trade we multiply e. a = f ( x e + e) 0 where is a positive scalar, f x > 0, f e < 0 and f e > 0. We further assume a convex abatement cost function q(a), where q a (a) > 0 and q(a) aa > 0.
Given all the determinants of the pro…t functions we de…ne pro…ts as:
In stage 2 of the game, given the amount of permits issued, the …rms maximize their pro…ts with respect to output and the number of permits they sell (buy) subject to the constraint of abatement. Therefore, the …rst order conditions for the domestic and the foreign …rms are: 8 > > > > > > > < > > > > > > > :
Second order conditions are satis…ed since xx < 0, ee < 0 , xx ee e + E = 0:
This equality simply states that the amount of permits that a …rm sells (buys) must be bought (sold) by the rival, or equivalently, the total amount of permits issued by the two governments equals the total number of permits used by the two …rms. The permits market clearing condition (3) determines P " . Therefore, the scenario that we follow allows the governments to issue unilaterally the number of permits they wish by maximizing their own national welfare and then allow the …rms to trade permits at a 8 For the uniqueness and local stability conditions in Cournot games see Dastidar (2000) .
given price.
Comparative statics
Here we examine the decisions made in stage 2 of the game and attain the comparative statics. The analysis considers …rst the case of a fully symmetric international duopoly.
The results of this benchmark are then generalized in a case where various asymmetries, e.g., di¤erences in abatement cost and in pollution damage functions may exist between the two countries. Further, they are extended to a more general case of a larger and unequal number of countries and …rms.
In particular, we focus the comparative statics on the sign of the so called strategic e¤ect that appears in eco-dumping models and leads to the prisoners dilemma situation.
The strategic e¤ect can be described as the e¤ect that domestic environmental regulation has on foreign output (which in turn a¤ects domestic pro…ts). Algebraically, in terms of our modelling, it is denoted by @X @e , where the asterisk denotes stage 2 equilibrium value. Note that before proceeding to the analysis that the sign of this derivative in the relevant literature is negative, i.e., @X @e < 0.
Symmetric Case
Holding the assumption that everything in the model is fully symmetric we use a simpler, than the traditional, way to obtain the sign of the partial derivatives. The following proposition presents the sign of the strategic e¤ect, @X @e , in the strategic environmental policy literature, and the signs of @e @e and @e @E which capture the way the domestic …rm's net supply of permits is altered when the domestic and foreign country's endowments of permits change:
Proposition 1:
(a) The strategic (regulation) e¤ect appears to be positive and equal to the direct (regulation) e¤ect on foreign and domestic equilibrium output respectively, i.e., @X @e = @x @e > 0.
(b)The e¤ects of a change in the domestic and foreign endowments of permits over the domestic permits net supply are @e @e = @e @E = 1 2 > 0.
(See proof in the Appendix )
The important implication of Proposition 1 is that when the domestic government changes the level of regulation, e, it will a¤ect in the same way both the domestic and foreign …rms' outputs, i.e., dx de = dX de > 0. Hence, in our case, the strategic e¤ect is positive instead of negative as it is in models of the standard strategic environmental policy literature, e.g., Barrett (1994) , Kennedy (1993) , Conrad (1993) , Rauscher (1994) and Ulph (1996) . It follows that when regulation in the home country is relaxed, the foreign …rm increases its output equally to the domestic …rm, while the pro…ts of both …rms fall.
We now turn to explaining the driving forces of this result. The negative sign of Part (b) of Proposition 1 determines the e¤ect that a change in the number of permits issued by a government has over the domestic (foreign) …rm's equilibrium net supply of permits. In particular, these e¤ects are given as @e @e = @e @E = 1 2 . These results depend crucially on part (a) of Proposition 1 which implies that equilibrium outputs will be the same across …rms and the market clearing condition (3). In terms of our modelling these partial e¤ects can be interpreted as follows: When the domestic government decides to issue a permit which allows an extra unit of emissions then the domestic …rm increases (reduces) the number of permits sold to (purchased from) the rival by 1 2 units of emissions. Hence, the rival is allowed to increase pollution by 1 2 units of emissions, since it can only use a proportion of the permits bought. At the same time, pollution emitted by the domestic …rm when a new permit is issued increases by 1 2 units of emissions. As it can be seen in equation (A2) given in the Appendix, equilibrium supply of permits is given from e = E = e E 2 , thus a¤ects the volume of traded permits. In case that pollution is perfectly transboundary ( = 1) then if e 6 = E the number of traded permits is minimized, while when the pollutant tends to be purely local ( ! 0) then this number becomes very large. More precisely, the number of traded permits is a decreasing function of . However, pollution in each country remains constant regardless of the level of .
Asymmetric Cases-Extensions
It would be interesting to examine whether the previous results would hold if we relax some assumptions or we allow for asymmetries between the two countries and …rms.
Speci…cally, we may consider abatement cost or pollution damage functions across the two countries. Moreover, extensions that would simulate more realistic examples would be the existence of a larger number of …rms and/or countries. Without loss of generality the previous analytical setting can accommodate such extensions and can replicate the major result so far. That is, in the case of tradable permits, the strategic e¤ect has a positive sign. The following proposition brings into line these suggestions:
Proposition 2:
(a) In case where the abatement cost and of pollution damage functions di¤er across …rms and countries, then the strategic e¤ect has a positive sign, i.e., @X @e > 0. (b) If we assume n > 2 countries, m > 2 …rms competing in the global market, where at least one …rm is located in each country, then under symmetry of all other things, the strategic e¤ect has a positive sign, i.e., @x i @e t = @x j @e t > 0.
Proposition 2 is a generalization of Proposition 1. It simply states that if we allow for di¤erent abatement cost functions among …rms, di¤erent assimilative capacities of the environments in the two countries, i.e., the damages caused from the same pollutant in the two countries di¤er, if the number of countries and …rms is higher than two, the basic implication remains una¤ected. The strategic e¤ect remains positive. Put it di¤erently, when the governments decide about the optimal number of permits, they face an additional disincentive to issue additional permits. This in turn has signi…cant implications in terms of welfare as we will show later on in the analysis.
The driving forces of this result follow those of Proposition 1. In brief, the common permits price faced by the …rms equalizes the marginal costs of abatement across …rms.
Given this, the problem reduces to a simple Cournot game with symmetric …rms, implying equal equilibrium output levels by the …rms in stage 2. Any parametric change, e.g., changes in the number of permits in one country, leads to a new equilibrium where outputs are still equal. Further extensions beyond Proposition 2 may be examined. However,
introducing several asymmetries such as di¤erences in abatement technologies require for a more elaborated analysis. The existence of di¤erent abatement technologies in the two countries, i.e., di¤erent 's, breaks down the symmetry argument presented so far. Once more the permits price is common for the …rms, implying that changes in the endowments of permits in one country a¤ect the permits price equally. Yet, this is not su¢ cient to yield q x ( ) = Q X ( ), which in turn implies that equilibrium outputs in stage 2 di¤er. Both, q x ( ) and Q X ( ), fall when the number of permits increases by one government, but not at the same level. As a result the output reaction function shift outwards asymmetrically.
Whether both equilibrium outputs increase or not, depends on the level of the change in the number of permits and on the slopes of the reaction functions. Nonetheless, the most likely scenario suggests that the strategic e¤ect maintains its positive sign.
Welfare E¤ects
In this section we examine the welfare e¤ects of environmental regulation, i.e., of pollution permits, by the two rival governments. In the analysis we retain the assumption of a perfectly symmetric international duopoly model. Before, however, proceeding to the welfare e¤ects of our analysis, it is enlightening to introduce the welfare e¤ects of two polar cases and see where does our scenario lie. The two polar cases are: …rst, the cooperative equilibrium where the two governments commonly decide the level of pollution and then distribute permits to the …rms and, second, the Nash equilibrium where each government unilaterally decides on the level of regulation without allowing trading of permits between the …rms. For clarity, we will denote our case as a "semi-cooperative" equilibrium since the governments issue permits unilaterally but allow a cross border trading of permits between …rms.
The Cooperative Equilibrium
Given that the two exporting countries are not consumers of the exporting good, the consumers surplus is captured exclusively by the changes in the damage function in the welfare analysis. Welfare in the home is determined as follows:
In the cooperative solution we assume that the governments agree prior to stage 1 to maximize the joint welfare, i.e., w +W . In stage 1 of the game the governments maximize w + W with respect to the number of issued permits in each of the two countries. Permits are then distributed to the …rms. In this way, we derive two …rst order conditions, one with respect to e and one with respect to E. However, it is straightforward that e and E are linearly dependent. In other words, the governments can determine a speci…c level of pollution that they are willing to accept and then distribute the total number of permits to the two …rms. Since the model is fully symmetric we assume that the total number of permits is equally distributed between their two exporting …rms. The …rst order conditions for the sum of welfare levels in the two countries are the following: 9 
and
The asterisks denote equilibrium values and below each term we indicate the partial e¤ect of e on the corresponding variables and its sign. The …rst two terms in (5) are zero by the …rm's maximization problem. We call the third term "general strategic e¤ect" and it corresponds to the strategic e¤ect introduced in the previous section, @X @e , multiplied by @ @X . The overall sign of this term is negative and compels the regulator towards a tighter standard. This term in a Barrett (1994) setting appears to be positive, in which case each regulator is forced to unilaterally set laxer standards, thus leading …rms towards a race to the bottom. The next term, with a positive sign, represents the direct bene…t from relaxing regulation, since the higher the standard is, the lower is the marginal cost of abatement. However, this comes at the cost of environmental deterioration represented by the sixth term. The permits price e¤ect is ambiguous. In case the domestic …rm is a permits seller (buyer) then the sign will be negative (positive) as @ @P " = e . The partial e¤ects for the foreign country follow similarly.
Using the properties of the model and the results so far, e.g., the permits price e¤ects cancel out since they have an opposite sign, @X @e = @x @e > 0 by Proposition 1 and @ @X = @ @x due to symmetry, equation (5) is simpli…ed to:
Equation (7) determines the level of permits issued in the domestic country such that the sum of the two countries welfare is maximized. It can be shown that the cooperative scenario that we propose is not restricting in the sense that it can be modi…ed and yield the same outcome. In particular, even if trade of permits is not allowed between …rms the cooperative solution in equilibrium yields the same level of regulation and thus the same welfare level. 10
The Nash Equilibrium
We now introduce the second polar case, where both governments set environmental standards unilaterally without allowing …rms to exchange permits. This is the core of the eco-dumping models presented above. In order to adjust our analytical speci…cation to these models, we assume that …rms cannot trade permits in stage 2, i.e., e = E = 0.
10 The proof can be provided upon request by the authors.
Thus, …rms maximize their pro…ts only with respect to their outputs. A well established result from the strategic environmental policy literature is that @X @e < 0. 11 Therefore, the welfare maximizing conditions are the following: 
for the domestic government and due to symmetry, for the foreign government it is implied by equation (6).
Comparing the permits reaction functions of the domestic government in the two polar cases given by equations (7) and (8), we observe that in the Nash equilibrium there is a bias in favor of laxer regulation (higher e), since contrary to the cooperative case, the general strategic e¤ect is now positive forcing the governments to relax further the regulation level. At the same time, when governments set their standards unilaterally they do not take into account the externality caused from their own …rms'emissions to the rival country strengthening this outcome. As a result a race to the bottom occurs in environmental policy setting among the rival governments, which lowers welfare in comparison to the cooperative case.
Another important implication is that even if we assume that in the Nash case gov-11 In order to determine this sign we can di¤erentiate the pro…t maximizing conditions of the …rms with respect to outputs and solve for the comparative statics: Given the signs of the second partial derivatives of pro…ts we obtain that dx de > 0 and dX de < 0.
ernments do not act strategically, 12 i.e., environmental regulation is set at the Pigouvian level, regulation will be laxer than the one in the cooperative scenario, resulting to lower welfare levels in both the exporting countries.
The Semi-Cooperative Equilibrium
Now we analyze the welfare e¤ects of issuing pollution permits in the case of the "semicooperative" equilibrium, whereby the governments select unilaterally the level of regulation but then the …rms are allowed to exchange pollution permits at a given price. The welfare maximizing conditions are the following: 
and the one given in equation (6) due to symmetry.
Note that since e = E , then by using equation (A2) in the Appendix e = E = e E 2 = 0. In this case the permits price e¤ect, i.e., the term @ @P "
@P " @e (= e @P " @e ) is zero. Hence, the equation (9) can be rewritten as follows: dw de = @ @X @X @e + @ @e @d @e = 0.
Comparing the modi…ed equation (10) to (8) we observe that in the former there is a bias towards tighter regulation because the general strategic e¤ect has a negative sign.
This implies that in the semi-cooperative equilibrium regulation will be tighter and thus pollution in the two countries will be lower. A double bene…t appears in this case. On the one hand, environmental degradation is dampened due to stricter regulation, and on the other hand, the two …rms coordinate and produce lower output increasing so the market price and thus increasing their pro…ts. This result remains una¤ected even if we assume that at Nash the governments act non-strategically, in which case the strategic e¤ect is zero.
Comparing the modi…ed equation (10) to (7) we directly observe that in the latter case regulation is tighter. The reason is twofold: …rst that the general strategic e¤ect in the cooperative equilibrium is twice as strong as in the case of the semi-cooperative equilibrium. Second in the cooperative case the governments take into account the cross border externality caused from pollution.
The following proposition summarizes the ranking of the three pollution equilibria and equilibrium welfare levels:
Proposition 3: The ranking of equilibrium pollution and welfare levels in the three di¤erent scenarios is: e Cooperative < e Semi cooperative < e N ash and w Cooperative > w Semi cooperative > w N ash .
Intuitively, in the cooperative equilibrium we maximize w + W . Therefore, the domestic country's welfare equals ( w +W 2 ) Cooperative when e = E . Since in the other two equilibria e is higher and welfare is a concave function of regulation, then regulation is set above the optimal level. This implies that w + W is lower and in turn
The ranking of welfare is an important feature proposed in this study. It simply states that a Pareto superior outcome in terms of welfare can be achieved if the governments act unilaterally but allow cross border trading of permits between the …rms compared to the case where they do not. Naturally, a question that arises from the analysis is that since the governments can agree to accept trade of permits, why don't they agree to a cooperative solution which maximizes their joint welfare? The answer to it is based on the sustainability issue. On the one hand, in the cooperative game, there is always an incentive for the governments to break up the agreement. Each government knows that in the cooperative equilibrium it can bene…t if it deviates unilaterally so that its own …rm gains a greater market share. This outcome becomes likelier as the coalition consists of a large number of participants.
On the other hand, the semi-cooperative equilibrium is sustainable. Both governments do not have an incentive to deviate unilaterally from the equilibrium level. If we assume that there exists a pre-stage level where the governments decide whether or not to accept permits issued in the rival country, then it can be shown that it is a dominant strategy to accept permits issued in the rival country regardless of what that country does. If, hypothetically, the foreign country announces that permits issued in the home country are not accepted, the home country should still accept permits from abroad. To understand this we should once more focus on stage 1 of the game where the level of regulation is determined. From equation (A2) we know that the domestic …rm buys permits from its foreign counterpart only if e < E. The governments anticipate this in stage 1. So, they assign a positive probability to that the domestic …rm will buy permits from the foreign one when they select the level of regulation, because each government does not observe the rival's choice. Hence, the objective welfare functions for the domestic and the foreign governments will be consisted by a weighted sum of the welfare functions in the two cases (semi-cooperative and Nash). As a result the domestic government will achieve higher welfare as regulation will be tighter in both countries. The mechanism proposed in this paper continue to apply, though a bit moderated.
What the paper neglected so far are the welfare e¤ects in ROW and hence, in global welfare. If ROW is negatively a¤ected from the pollution caused in the two exporting countries then by all means ROW is bene…ted when the exporting countries allow the trade of permits. Yet, this does not mean that the citizens will be better o¤. Since the citizens in ROW are the consumers of the product, they will be damaged when permits are tradable as the price will be higher. Which of the two e¤ects will prevail is uncertain and depends on the selected functions. If the pollutant is very injurious then welfare in ROW will be higher in the semi-cooperative than the Nash scenario and the reverse.
Using a similar rationale global welfare implications follow.
The Role of Market Power
To this point we assumed a competitive permits market where for a given market clearing price P " , …rms in stage 2 of the game decide, among other things, on the number of permits to trade, i.e., to buy from (sell to) the rival. Here on this assumption is relaxed.
In particular, we consider the case whereby …rms can in ‡uence the permits price when they select their desired number of permits to trade. If so, then in stage 2 of the game, …rms no longer are price takers in the permits market. This non-competitive speci…cation, however, creates analytical complexities which a¤ect the clarity of the results. For this we adopt speci…c linear functional forms already used in the relevant literature to facilitate the analysis. Thus, we assume that the inverse demand function of the consumers in the third country is P (x; X) = B x X, where B is the demand intercept. The inverse demand function implies that the good is homogenous (x and X are perfect substitutes).
In the same spirit we assume that , = 1, c(x) = cx, q(a) = 1 2 ga 2 and that the damage from pollution is represented by d(e + E) = 1 2 k(e + E) 2 . Moreover, k, g and c are positive scalars. In the Appendix of the paper we set out the competitive, non-market power, solution of the linear speci…cation, to which we compare the results of the market power scenario.
The assumption …rms possessing market power in the permits market, implies that the …rms do not know how their decision regarding the supply of permits a¤ects the demand function of the rival and the price of permits. To facilitate the analysis we introduce the "implicit" demand functions for permits. The use of this term refers to the marginal utility obtained by each …rm from buying one permit. Here, the marginal utility of every additional permit equals to the reduction of the marginal cost of abatement. Hence, the implicit demand for permits for the domestic …rm is P " = g(x e + e). The sign in front of e is positive. Recalling that when e < 0 the …rm demands permits it follows that the demand function has a negative sign. Given this, the derivatives @P " @e , @P " @E = g are calculated by the …rms when they select the supply of permits. The maximization problem that the …rm faces is: 13
subject to e + E = 0.
The …rst order conditions with respect to output remain unchanged. Substituting the constraint into the objective function and di¤erentiating with respect to x and P " we obtain the …rst order conditions for the domestic …rm: 
where @E @P " = 1 g . Solving simultaneously (12) with the corresponding foreign ones and using the equilibrium condition for the permits market given by (3) we obtain the equilibrium outputs, supply of permits and permits price, as a function of the domestic and foreign number of permits issued by the governments: 8 > > > > > > > < > > > > > > > : .
Comparing the stage 2 equilibrium values in (13) to those in (A4) given in the Appendix, i.e., the market power versus non-market power, yields an important result. The equilibrium values of permits supply (demand) are lower than in the case where the …rms possess market power. This is due to the fact that @E @P " = 1 g > 0. This denotes the market power of the domestic …rm and implies that a possible increase in the permits price P " lowers the foreign demand for permits. This reduces the amount of permits sold, while the opposite holds in case the domestic …rm is an importer of permits. On the one hand the higher price yields higher pro…ts, while on the other hand, a higher price implies lower exports which reduces the revenues. Hence, these two opposing forces must be balanced by the …rms. As a result, the supply of permits is reduced so that the domestic …rm exercises its market power over the foreign …rm's demand and vice-versa.
In the case of non-market power (directly follows from Proposition 1) the derivative of the supply of permits e with respect to the number of permits issued by the governments e and E is de de = 1 2 and de dE = 1 2 , respectively. These results imply that for every permit issued, half of it is sold to the rival …rm. Hence, we concluded that relaxing regulation would a¤ect both …rms'marginal cost of abatement equally, eliminating the incentive for the strategic use of regulation. Allowing …rms to exercise market power in the permits market the corresponding derivatives become de de = 1 2(2+g) > 0 and de dE = 1 2(2+g) < 0, which are smaller in absolute terms than 1 2 . This implies that an increase in e will create an incentive to the domestic …rm to sell a proportion of these permits, yet this proportion is lower than half of the quantity issued. This is in line with the results proposed by Malueg and Yates (2009) and Lange (2008) who illustrated that a multilateral oligopoly in the permits markets restricts the volume of trade and leads to an ine¢ cient outcome. 14 In other words, the marginal costs of abatement, are now a¤ected asymmetrically when the endowments of allowances change in the two countries. For every additional permit issued by a government the …rm uses a proportion above 50% for increasing production and the rest for selling its allowances to the rival …rm, which in turn can increase its own production. Since the derivative is lower than half, when the domestic (foreign) government relaxes regulation for the …rm located in that country, it decreases the marginal cost of abatement for both …rms. The decrease for the …rm that is located in this country, is greater in absolute terms than the one of the rival. As a result, two opposing forces appear concerning the output of the rival …rm. First, a lower marginal cost of abatement implies higher output. Second, the reduction in marginal cost of abatement appears to be greater for the domestic …rm and thus domestic output increases more than the foreign one. Consequently, a negative e¤ect appears on the foreign output through the reaction function of output which is negatively sloped. The net e¤ect is negative as suggested by the derivative dX de = g (2+g)(3+g) < 0, obtained after di¤erentiating foreign output in (13) with respect to the amount of permits issued in the home country. This is due to the fact that the second e¤ect prevails to the …rst one.
A direct implication carried out from the aforementioned analysis is that the strategic e¤ect is negative which implies that the governments have the incentive to relax the regulation level below the …rst best (Pigouvian) level. However, this incentive is aggravated when permits are non-tradable (i.e., they take the form of a binding emission standard for the …rm). The implications concerning welfare are signi…cant since the intensity of the prisoners dilemma in the governments game, when permits are tradable, is mitigated such that it leads to increased welfare levels in both countries, compared to the non-tradable permits scenario. This, as well as, a welfare ranking across the polar cases are provided explicitly in the following proposition:
Proposition 4:
(a) Welfare with market power < Welfare with no market power. The main implication re ‡ected by Proposition 4 is that the welfare ranking within the di¤erent scenarios is not a¤ected by the introduction of market power in the permits market. We do, however, understand that if the permits price is not set exogenously to the …rms, the e¢ ciency of the semi-cooperative scenario is reduced. The driving force of this outcome is that the sign of the strategic e¤ect is reversed. Despite this outcome, the semi-cooperative scenario still yields a Pareto superior outcome both in terms of pollution and welfare compared to the case suggested in the eco-dumping models. As a result, all the bene…ts and possible implications of such a scenario continue to apply.
Conclusion
Our aim in this paper was to investigate if and how, the introduction of tradable permits in a model of strategic environmental policy could alter the standard result in the literature, namely: in an oligopolistic international market structure with …rms competing a-là Cournot, each government engaging in international competition has a unilateral incentive to set the environmental policy level below the …rst best. We show that in the case where the …rms do not have market power in the permits market, allowing them to exchange permits, reverses the sign of the strategic e¤ect from negative (in the case of non-tradable permits) to positive although in equilibrium no trade of permits takes place! This indicates a reversal of the incentives of the involved governments towards not fully internalizing the externality caused from pollution. In our model, both governments appear to be unwilling to assist the rival …rm to increase output through lowering the marginal cost of abatement ensured by the possibility of buying permits. This implies that both governments are negative towards selecting lax regulation levels, over-internalizing pollution. The introduction of tradable permits can be viewed alternatively as the introduction by the governments of a more complex strategy. Such a strategy suggests that the choice of the optimal level of regulation in each country should be a function of the choice of the rival government. When, for instance, e > E then the domestic government allows the domestic …rm to increase pollution above the binding level of e by e E 2 and the reverse. This alternative scenario yields the same properties as the "semi-cooperative" one suggested in this study when the permits market is competitive.
What are the implications of this result? The appearance of a disincentive to relax the country-speci…c environmental policy, leads governments towards tightening their standards. Hence, the prisoners dilemma at the government level is reversed, which results in higher welfare levels in both exporting countries compared to the case where the governments do not allow the …rms to exchange permits. However, equilibrium welfare remains lower than the corresponding cooperative one. These results are still valid when …rms exercise market power in the permits market. The introduction of market power causes welfare losses without altering the welfare ranking between the three scenarios.
The main bene…t of the alternative scenario suggested in this paper, i.e., choosing the number of permits unilaterally but allowing …rms exchanging them, is that it is feasible.
Put it di¤erently, the governments would not have an incentive to deviate from this strategy.
Possible extensions of our model could concern the welfare e¤ects after the introduction of moderations or asymmetries in the model as suggested in section 2. If we allow for a larger number of players (…rms and governments) in the game our welfare implications remain robust. Yet, allowing several asymmetries, as for instance, that the two countries have di¤erent scalars determining the marginal cost of abatement or marginal damage functions a more elaborated analysis is demanded and it is left for future research. In particular, the welfare e¤ects are uncertain. If the range of these asymmetries is insignificant or rather small, we expect our main results to hold. If not, then possibly one of the two countries will be harmed a¤ecting so the sustainability issue. the second equation in (2) gives P " = q e . Now x = 0 and X = 0 can be rewritten as:
We observe that the term P " is common for both …rms. Since the problem is symmetric we can solve the two …rst order conditions, x = 0 and X = 0, separately from the rest and we obtain that in stage 2 equilibrium outputs are equal, i.e., x = X . Having that P " is common for both …rms ) @qx @e = @P " @e = @Q X @e < 0. Hence, ceteris paribus a change in the domestic level of regulation a¤ects equally the domestic and foreign marginal cost of abatement which implies @x @e = @X @e > 0 Q.E.D. (b) Since P " is common for both …rms, from the other set of equations in (2), e = 0 and E = 0, is implied that abatement cost functions are the same across …rms ) q e = Q E , x e + e = X E + E. Recalling that x = X and using the market clearing condition (3) we obtain:
Di¤erentiating (A1) we get @e @e = @e @E = 1 2 > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
(a) If abatement cost functions are di¤erent across …rms and everything else is symmetric ) q( ) 6 = Q( ). From (2) it follows that P " = q e = Q E which implies that the pro…t maximizing conditions with respect to output are the same as in (A1). Since everything else is symmetric it follows that equilibrium outputs in stage 2 are equal. Using @qx @e = @Q X @e = @P " @e < 0 ) @x @e = @X @e > 0 Q.E.D. The fact that the damage functions are di¤erent across countries, i.e., d( ) 6 = D( ) should not a¤ect …rms' …rst order conditions in stage 2 since the damage functions do not appear in the …rms'objective functions. Hence, Proposition's 1 implications remain unchanged Q.E.D.
(b) Firms'…rst order conditions are in total 2 m and are given by: 
where i describes a random …rm, i.e., i = 1; 2; :::; m. From the second equation in (A3) we obtain that P " = q 1 e = ::: = q i e = ::: = q m e . Using that q i x = q i a and q i e = q i a )
q i x = q i e ) q i x = P " . It follows that i x = r i x c i x P " = 0. Since everything is symmetric stage 2 equilibrium outputs will be equal, i.e., x i = x j where i 6 = j. Using this and @q i x @e t = @q j x @e t = @P " @e t < 0 ) @x i @e t = @x j @e t > 0, where i 6 = j and t stands for a random country, i.e., t = 1; 2; :::; n Q.E.D.
Stage 2 equilibrium for the linear speci…cation case with no market power: Solving simultaneously the system of equations given in (2) and the market clearing condition for permits given by equation (3) we obtain the equilibrium outputs, net supply of permits and permits price, as a function of the domestic and foreign total number of permits issued by the governments: .
We observe from (A4) that dx de = dX de = g 2(3+g) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:
(a) In the linear speci…cation with market power, the derivatives of the terms that represent the market power with respect to P " are equal to zero. Algebraically these terms are represented by @ 2 E @P "2 = @ 2 e @P "2 = 0. Using (10) we illustrate that in equilibrium the number of issued permits in the case of market power is greater than the corresponding one in the case of non-market power. Since dX de = g (2+g)(3+g) < 0 ) the general strategic e¤ect is positive. Thus, a force towards laxer regulation is present. Using the same rationale as in Proposition 3 it follows that Welfare with market power < Welfare with no market power Q.E.D.
(b) From part (a) and Proposition 3 it follows that welfare in the cooperative case is higher than the one in the semi-cooperative case with market power. It remains to show that the latter is greater than the Nash welfare. For this it is su¢ cient to show that e is greater in the Nash case.
In order to solve for stage 2 outputs in the Nash case in the absence of tradable permits, we solve backwards. The initial equations are the same as in the linear speci…cation case with the di¤erence that now we set e = E = 0. Thus, in stage 2 …rms have x and X as choice variables. Solving simultaneously the pro…t maximizing conditions with respect to outputs given in (2), we obtain equilibrium outputs in stage 2 as functions of e and E: x = (B c)(1 + g) + g(2 + g)e gE (1 + g)(3 + g) and X = (B c + )(1 + g) + g(2 + g)E ge (1 + g)(3 + g) .
Di¤erentiating X with respect to e we have @X @e = g (1+g)(3+g) . Yet, @X @e < @X @e ) the general strategic e¤ect is stronger in the Nash scenario than in the semi-cooperative ) regulation will be laxer in the …rst case Q.E.D.
